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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In previous works, Sampaio de Sousa e Ramos de Sousa (1999a, 1999b) used non-
parametric techniques - DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) and FDH (Free Disposal 
Hull) to measure the level of technical efficiency for the Brazilian municipalities. This 
research permitted to evaluate the performance of the Brazilian cities and furnished an 
instrumental flexible enough to be used for evaluating local governments. Yet, we 
should emphasize the exploratory nature of those works. Besides the data set 
limitations, the computed indicators should be careful used, as the inefficiencies found 
are not explained only by managerial incompetence or by the inexistence of satisfactory 
incentive schemes to assure an adequate functioning of the communes. Due to the 
deterministic nature of non-parametric models, such inefficiencies may also reflect the 
presence of atypical observations, measurement errors, omitted variables and other 
statistical discrepancies.  
 
Additionally, in DEA methods, heterogeneity of the data set may aggravate this problem 
and underestimate, substantially, efficiency scores as in those methods, the frontier is 
constituted by a small number of municipalities. This problem becomes particularly 
preoccupant when the data set is both huge and diverse, as is the case of the Brazilian 
municipalities. Here, the size and heterogeneity of sample makes it virtually impossible 
to manually detect the outliers and/or errors, thus requiring the use of some automatic 
approach. Therefore, to make efficiency scores credible it is necessary to use an 
adequate procedure to correct those indices for outliers. Only then, one may hope to 
obtain truly representative estimators, which could be useful for the decision making 
process.   
  
Moreover, those inefficiencies may also be caused by the existence of exogenous 
factors, that are out of the control of the municipalities such as natural and climatic 
characteristics, political factors, demographic and socio economic features, which have 
not been taken into consideration on the previous non-parametric analysis. The 
importance of those aspects has been pointed out by several studies, using different 
techniques, in an attempt to separate the influence of those factors from the ones 
associated with productive efficiency and thus get a “pure” measure of technical 
efficiency (see Lovell, Walters and Wood (1990), Kalirajan (1990), McCarty e 
Yaisawarng (1993), Gillen e Lall (1997) e Yu (1998)). Hence, the key issue here is to 
identify the conditioning factors lying behind the efficiency scores. 
  
In this paper we estimate efficiency indices for the Brazilian municipalities by using 
Bootstrap and Jackknife resampling techniques to eliminate the effect of outliers and 
possible errors in the data set, using both the constant and variable returns to scale 
variants of the DEA method. After computing the efficiency scores we use techniques 
of spatial econometrics and quantile regressions to investigate the determinants of those 
computed efficiency scores.  
   
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology used to compute 
the outliers-corrected DEA efficiency scores. Section 3 briefly comments the data set 
and the choice of the indicators used as proxies for the supply of local public services. 
Section 4  discusses the non-parametric efficiency estimators obtained. Section 5 
presents the econometric results of the analysis of the conditional factors underlying 
those scores. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the main conclusions of our study.   
 
2. DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS MEASUREMENTS OF TECHNICAL 
EFFICIENCY 
 
Non-parametric deterministic approaches to efficiency measurements are characterized 
by the use of very weak assumptions concerning the reference technology. Except for 
the usual regularity axioms such as the bounded-ness and closed-ness of the technology, 
those methods rely on very simple hypothesis such as convexity and strong free 
disposability in inputs and outputs. In particular, the linear programming based 
techniques, known as DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis).
1 Below we will briefly 
describe those methodologies. 
 
2. 1 Data Envelopment Analysis Reference Technology 
 
For each decision making unit (DMU), the technology transforms nonnegative inputs  
x
k = ( xk1, ..., xkN ) ∈ ℜ+
N into the nonnegative outputs  y
k = ( yk1,..., ykM) ∈ ℜ+
M.  For the 
input-based measures of technical efficiency, the technology is represented by its 
production possibility set  T = {(x,y): x can produce y}, the set of all feasible input-
output vectors. The input correspondence for the DEA reference technology, 
characterized by constant returns to scale (C) and strong  disposability of inputs (S) 
defines a piecewise linear technology constructed on the basis of observed input-output 
combinations: 
 
(2.1)  L(y |C, S) = { x: y ≤ zM,  zN  ≤ x, z ∈ ℜ+
K , y ∈ ℜ+
M } 
 
The k x m matrix M contains the m observed outputs of each of the k observations in the 
data set, N is the k x n  matrix of observed inputs and z is the 1 x k vector of intensity 
parameters.
2 Now, for each activity, the technical efficiency on inputs, Fi, may be 
defined, as: 
(2.2)      Fi (y
k, x
k | C,S)  =  min{θ: θ x ∈ L(y
k | C,S)} 
 
This radial efficiency measure is always situated between zero and one. The efficient 
production on the isoquant is indicated by the unity. Thus, 1-θ represents the proportion 
at which the inputs could be reduced without changing the production. By using the 
technology specified in (2.1), technical efficiency for the municipality k may be 
computed as the solution for the following linear program:  
 
(2.3)   Fi (y
k, x
k | C,S)  = θ 
DEA-CCR  =  min   θ  
                             θ
 , z 
subject to:  
                                                       θ 
 xnk -  Σk=1
K  zk
 xnk
  ≥ 0           n = 1,..., N
  
 
                   Σj=1
K zk
 ykm
  ≥ yrk,                     m = 1,..., M 
 
                                                θ 
 , zk 
 ≥   0                                  k = 1,..., K 
 
 2This first version of the DEA methodology – henceforth mentioned as CCR – implies 
strong restrictions concerning the production set. In particular, this methodology 
presupposes constant returns to scale. This hypothesis can be easily relaxed by 
modifying the restrictions on the intensity vector, z. Maintaining the hypothesis of 
strong disposability,  Färe, Grosskopf and Lovell (1985, 1994) extended this technique 
to include the existence of non increasing returns to scale by adding, to program (2.3), 
the following restriction:  
 
(2.4)    ∑
K
k=1 zk  ≤  1 
 
Here, the sum of the intensity variables cannot exceed the unity implying that the 
different activities can be contracted but cannot be expanded limitlessly. In the case of 
variable returns to scale model (Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984)), activities cannot 
be expanded or contracted radially without limits and radial contractions to the origin 
are also excluded. The feasible set of activities is formed by all convex combination of 
observed activities, located on the boundary of the productive set. We have, thus, 
increasing returns for low levels of production and decreasing returns for higher levels. 
It is well known that the efficiency indexes associated with this technology - henceforth 
denominated DEA-BCC – are obtained by imposing equality on restriction  (2.4). 
 
 2.2 The Leverage and “Jackstrap” Procedure  
 
As previously mentioned, one of the main drawbacks of DEA is that the efficiency 
scores are rather sensitive to presence of DMUs that perform extremely well (so called 
outliers), which may stem from some outstanding practice, or may simply be the result 
of errors in the data. In either case, the results for the remaining DMUs become shifted 
towards lower efficiency values, the efficiency frequency distribution becomes highly 
asymmetric, and the overall efficiency scale becomes non-linear. Several approaches 
have been proposed to deal with this effect (Wilson (1993,1995), Banker and Gifford 
(1985), Seaver and Triantis (1989)) but they largely depend on manual inspection of 
data, which becomes virtually impossible for large data sets, like the one used in this 
paper. To tackle this issue, we will use a recently proposed method by Stosic and 
Sampaio de Sousa (2003), based on a combination of Bootstrap and Jackknife 
resampling schemes, for automatic detection of outliers. This approach is based on the 
concept of leverage, that is, the effect produced on the outcome of DEA efficiencies of 
all the other DMUs, when the observed DMU is removed from the data set (See Cribari-
Neto and Zarkos (2002). The leverage information is calculated for each DMU, and it is 
then used to detect outliers and errors in the data set, and automatically eliminate them, 
or just reduce their influence. The underlying idea is that outliers are expected to show 
leverage much above the mean and then should be selected with lower probability than 
the other DMUs. Below we will briefly describe this procedure. 
 
Leverage of a single observed DMU might be understood as the quantity that measures 
the impact of removal of the DMU from the data set, on the efficiency scores of all the 
other DMUs. Formally, it may be defined as the standard deviation of the efficiency 
measures before and after the removal. The most straightforward possibility is to 
perform Jackknife resampling technique as follows. One first applies DEA for each of 
the DMUs using the unaltered original data set, to obtain the set of efficiencies 
{ K k k , , 1 | … = } θ . Then, one by one DMU is successively removed, and each time the 
 3set of efficiencies { } j k K k kj ≠ = ; , , 1 |
* … θ
()
 is recalculated, where index   
represents the removed DMU. The leverage of j-th DMU may then be defined as 
standard deviation 
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While rather straightforward, this direct approach is extremely computationally 
intensive, and may turn unfeasible for very large data sets with the available computer 
resources. More precisely, removing each of the K DMUs from the data set and then 
performing (K-1) DEA calculations requires solving K(K-1) linear programs, and may 
become prohibitively computationally expensive for large K. We therefore proposed a 
more efficient stochastic procedure, which combines Bootstrap resampling with the 
above Jackknife scheme as follows:  
 
1.  Select randomly a subset of L DMUs (typically 10% of K) and perform the above 
procedure to obtain subset leverages  1 k  , where index   takes on L (randomly 
selected) values from the set  . 
k
2.  Repeat the above step B times, accumulating the subset leverage information   for 
all randomly selected DMUs (for B large enough, each DMU should be selected 
roughly   times).  BL nk ≈













    











   
 
This completes the first phase of the proposed approach. In the second phase, one can 
either use the leverage information to detect and simply eliminate outliers from the data 
set, or one can implement Bootstrap method to produce confidence intervals and bias 
information, using leverage information to reduce the probability of selecting the 
outliers in the stochastic resampling process. In this paper we used the Heaviside step 
function, given by 
 








         
  
 
 4Here the threshold level  K log
~
   was chosen in order to take into account the sample 
size, so that for e.g. K=1000 a DMU with leverage greater than three times the global 
mean is rejected. 
 
3. DATA   
 
The implementation of the above outlined methodologies requires information about 
aggregate total costs and other relevant inputs, as well as the amount of public services 
available to the population for the municipalities (outputs). Initially, information for the 
5264 Brazilians municipalities was collected. We excluded data for municipalities for 
which some key information was missing. These way 620 communes were dropped 
since 493 of them had a recorded population of zero and 127 others had no data on 
current expenditure.
3 The final data set was composed of 4796 municipalities. All data 
refers to the year 2000. 
 
3.1 Input and Output Indicators for the Brazilian Municipalities 
 
A list of inputs and outputs are provided in Table 3.1, together with their respective 
sources, and the public service they are supposed to represent. 
 
Table 3.1 - Input and Output Indicators and the Corresponding Municipal Services – 2000 
Input and Output Indicators  Source  Municipal Services of which 
indicators serve as proxies 
- Input Indicators    
1. Current spending  STN
1  Aggregate total costs 
2. Number of teachers  Censo Escolar/MEC  Personnel input 
3. Rate of infant mortality  IBGE
2  Public health services 
4. Hospital and health services  IBGE  Public health services 
- Output Indicators    
1.Total resident population  IBGE  Administrative services  
2. Literate population   MEC
3 Educational  services 
3. Enrollment
4 per school  Censo Escolar/MEC  Educational services 
4. Student attendance per school  Censo Escolar/MEC  Educational services 
5. Students approved per school  Censo Escolar/MEC Educational  services 
6. Students in the right class per school  Censo Escolar/MEC  Educational services 
7. Domiciles with access to safe water  IBGE  Health and housing conditions 
8. Domiciles with access to sewage system  IBGE  Health and housing conditions 
9. Domiciles with access to garbage 
collection 
IBGE  Health and housing conditions 
Sources: 1: STN - Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional (National Treasure Secretariat); 2: IBGE - Instituto 
Brasileiro de Estatística, Censo Demográfico de 2000; 3: MEC  - Ministério da Educação; 4: All data refer to 
primary and secondary municipal schools. 
 
Aggregate total costs were computed as the value of municipal current spending. The 
other inputs used were the number of teachers (as a proxy for personnel inputs), the 
number of hospital and health centers, as they are the main providers of health services. 
The rate of infant mortality stands as an input because if health services are efficient, 
this indicator should be as low as possible. As for output measures, due to the 
impossibility of quantifying directly the supply of public services, they were 
approximated by a set of selected indicators, which are observable factors taken as 
 5proxies for the services supplied. After a careful choice, nine output indicators were 
retained.  
 
4.  NON-PARAMETRIC EFFICIENCY RESULTS  
 
Figures 1 and 2 presents the histograms of all efficiency measures calculated for the 
Brazilian municipalities, by using the CCR and the BCC method, as well as a non 
parametric estimated  (solid line) of the density of the estimates obtained by means of 
the kernel method (with gaussian kernel. The scores are restricted to the standard 
interval, e.g., take values between zero and one. Note that the distribution of those 
measures is approximately symmetrical, with a high concentration around the average.  
 





















Figure 1. Histogram of the efficiency measures (CCR method). The solid line gives a non-parametric  
estimate of their density.  
 
 




















 6Figure 2. Histogram of the efficiency measures (BCC method). The solid line gives a non-parametric 
estimate of their density.  
.  
 
Let us first discuss the CCR results. The mean for those scores is 0.5222, the median is 
0.5031, and the standard deviation is 0.1757; the first and the third quartile are 0.3952 
and 0.6257, respectively. The symmetry of this distribution is shown by the closeness 
between the mean and the median. The municipality with the lowest score (0.0946) is 
São Félix do Coribe, located in the Bahia state. Only 85 municipalities form the 
efficiency frontier.  Concerning the DEA-BCC estimates (variables returns to scale) the 
data set includes 4755 municipalities. Input and output variables are the same ones used 
in the CCR model. Here the mean and median scores are 0.5249 and 0.5073 
respectively. Maximum and minimum indices are 0.0774 and 1. The standard deviation 
is 0.1652 and the first and third quartiles are, respectively, 0.4093 and 0.6198. Only 79 
municipalities (1.66% of the total observations build up the frontier. Figure 2 shows the 
histogram of the observed efficiency levels.. 
 
Table 4.1 shows descriptive statistics for the computed efficiency scores, for each 
Brazilian region. For the CCR estimates, all the regions present efficient communes. 
Indeed, from the 85 classified as efficient, 6 belong to North region, 19 to the Northeast, 
4 in the Center-West and 46 in the Southeast region (from those, 32 are located in the 
State of São Paulo). Thus, more than a half of the efficient municipalities are on the 
Southeast region, and this region also has the highest average efficiency scores although 
it presents also the minimum score except for those pertaining to the Northeast region.  
   
For the BCC variant, the geographical distribution of the 79 efficient municipalities is 
the following: 6(six) are located in the North region, 21 (twenty one) are found in the 
Northeast region, 4(four) are situated in the Center-West, 38 are part of the Southeast 
region and 10 belong to the South region. Notice that the state of São Paulo presents 26 
efficient communes, practically one third of the total efficient municipalities.  
 
 
Table 4.1 - Summary of the DEA Efficiency Measures by Region  – CCR and BCC 
Variants – 2000 
 DEA-CCR  DEA-BCC 
Region  Mean Median Minimum Maximum  Mean  Median Minimum  Maximum 
North  0.5134 0.5014  0.1602  1.0000  0.5270  0.5090  0.1675  1.0000 
Northeast  0.5051 0.4882  0.0947  1.0000  0.5220  0.5071  0.0774  1.0000 
Center-west  0.5266 0.4977  0.1862  1.0000  0.5113  0.4921  0.1605  1.0000 
Southeast  0.5554 0.5313  0.1222  1.0000  0.5460  0.5282  0.1085  1.0000 
South  0.5056 0.4886  0.1497  1.0000  0.5052  0.4911  0.1727  1.0000 
 
 
5. CONDITIONAL FACTORS AFFECTING THE COMPUTED EFFICIENCY 
SCORES: AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
 
Let us now turn to the estimation of the regression models that try to identify the factors 
determining the computed efficiency scores for the Brazilian municipalities. The 
dependent variable (EFIC) is the efficiency measure obtained by using the DEA 
 7method. The explicative variables describe relevant characteristics of the municipalities 
considered.   
 
5.1 The Econometric Model 
 
Let n be the number of municipalities,  )' ,..., ( 1 n θ θ θ =  the vector of efficiency scores, X 
a matrix of dimension n x p,  containing the municipality characteristics, β  a p-
dimensional vector of unknown parameters and e u a n-dimensional vector of random 
errors. Thus, we can write a regression model as  
 
. ,..., 1 , ) ; ( n t u x f t t t = + = β θ  
 
Here,   denotes the p-dimensional vector of the characteristics of the t-th municipality. 
As we do not have a priori information about the functional form of f, we suppose 
linearity,    
t x
 
. u X + = β θ  
 
As the efficiency scores are restricted to assume values within the standard unitary 
interval, ( 1 0 ≤ <θ ), the OLS estimator will be inconsistent in the sense that it will not 
converge on probability to the true unknown parameter. Yet, it has been shown in the 
literature that the use of log( ) θ  as dependent variable leads to consistent and unbiased 
OLS estimates if the computed scores assume only strictly positive values.  
 
Furthermore, when the dependent variable is censored, as is the case with our scores, 
the OLS estimator of a linear regression will not be consistent and such inconsistency 
worsens with the proportion of the censored observation in the sample. A proof of this 
result, under some regularity conditions is given in Greene (1981). This implies that the 
problem of non-consistency will not be serious when the number of censored 
observation is small. Censored observations may be appropriated tackled by the Tobit 
model. In this model, parameters are usually estimated by using the maximum 
likelihood method (ML) under the suppositions of normality and homoskedasticity. 
Notice that the absence of normality as well as the presence of heteroskedasticity lead to 
inconsistent ML estimates. Another important aspect of modeling in classical or Tobit 
regression, in our particular case, is the possibility of existence of spatial effects leading 
to the existence of some functional relationship between the municipal efficiency 
structures in two distinct points in the considered space. The smaller the area where 
those points are located, the higher is the probability of the existence of the 
geographical correlation. Anselin (1988) proposed the following model to explicitly 
consider the spatial dependency: 
 
u X Wy + + = β ρ θ  ,    with  u , e Wu + = λ  
 
where W is a n x n matrix that controls the existence of a neighborhood relationship 
among localities. Here, the parameter ρ  measures the spatial correlation that if present, 
implies that the computed efficiency score of a given municipality is directly affected 
by the scores of its neighbors. The parameterλ captures the spatial correlation between 
the errors and e stands for a new error term.
4 
 8 
Here we will use two forms for the W matrix: firstly, the element (i,j) from W will be 
one if the municipalities i and j are neighbors and zero on the opposite case. In this case 
neighborhood will be defined as the geographical distance equal or inferior to 50 
kilometers; secondly, the element (i,j) from W will be equal to the distance between the 
municipalities i and j divided by the maximum distance encountered; hence, we have a 
measure between zero and one for all peer of localities and not only a binary measure of 
neighborhood.  
 
As the municipalities differ significantly on various aspects, it is reasonable to expect 
that their associated errors also present distinct variances. Thus, when estimating the 
parameters we should take into account the existence of heteroskedasticity. 
  
Hence, the unknown parameters will be estimated by using the linear regression model 
instead of the Tobit model. The reasons of such choice are listed below.  
 
1.  Contrary to the Tobit model, the linear model does not require the supposition of 
normality that could be restrictive assumption as we have no information about this 
issue.  
2. The OLS estimates proved to be unbiased and consistent even if the 
heteroskedasticity is neglected whereas this is not true for the ML estimators of the 
Tobit model.      
3.  It is possible to obtain an estimate for the covariance matrix associated with the OLS 
estimatorβ that is consistent under the homoskedasticity and the heteroskedasticity 
hypotheses (see below); hence, we can make hypothesis tests that are asymptotically 
valid, independently of the structure of the variance of errors and of its distribution. 
These convenient properties do not apply to the Tobit estimators.  
4.  The proportion of the censored observation on the whole sample is very low (around 
1.8%).  
 
As for the covariance matrix of the OLS estimator of the parameter β  (point 3 above), 
different estimators can be find in the specialized literature. White (1980) proposed a 
consistent estimator, commonly used in empirical modeling and known as HC0. This 
estimator is given by  
 
, ) ' ( ˆ ' ) ' (
1 1 − − Ω X X X X X X  
 
where  is a n x n diagonal matrix, containing in its principal diagonal the square of the  
OLS residuals. However, Monte Carlo simulations studies have shown that this 
estimator tends to produce tests that are too liberal in the sense that their true size is 
superior to the significance levels of the tests (See Cribari-Neto (2003), Long e Ervin 
(2000) e MacKinnon e White (1985)). 
Ω ˆ
 
Alternative estimators to the White test were proposed. Among them we find the HC3, 
where the t-th element of the diagonal de Ω ˆ  is not  , but  , where   is the 
t-th element of the diagonal of the “hat matrix”,  . As h  gives a 
degree of leverage associated to the observation t, this estimator includes a correction 
for the distinct leverage levels. Simulation results have shown that this estimator leads 
2 ˆt u
H
2 2 ) 1 /( ˆ t t h u −





 9to more precise inferences than the White estimator (HC0) and its other variants (see 
Davidson e MacKinnon (1993) e Long e Ervin (2000)). Cribari-Neto (2003) proposed 





δ ) 1 ( − ) / , 4 min( p nht t = δ , instead of using ( . Numerical results show 
that  quasi-t tests, whose statistics use this estimator typically, present lower size 
distortions when compared with alternative tests. Indeed, those results show that the 
performance of the test based on HC4 is similar to the ones based on double bootstrap 
schemes that are highly computational intensive.  
2 ) 1 t h −
 
5.2 Estimation Results: The Linear Model 
 
Let us now discuss the estimations. The dependent variables correspond to the 
logarithm natural of the efficiency scores for 4755 Brazilian municipalities computed by 
using the DEA-CCR and the DEA-BCC variants. In this first version we try to include 
most of the municipalities characteristics except the ones that were almost certain 
multicollinear. Some of these variables are dummy variables that assume value one if 
the related characteristic is present and zero in its absence. The second model was 
estimated considering only the regressors that were significant in the first version. In 
both models, the results were obtained by using the linear regression model, the 
parameters were estimated by ordinary least squares and their standard errors were 
estimated by using the HC3 estimator above described. Table 5. presents the explicative 
variables as well as the econometric results for two models for each DEA variant. To 
facilitate the discussion we will group the results by category of explicative variable. 
 
Spatial and localization effects: Looking at table 5.1, we first notice the relevance of the 
neighborhood effect in the spatial distribution of the efficiency scores. Indeed, in the 
four models tested, we find a positive spatial correlation indicating that higher 
efficiency levels tend to spread out, at least, partially, to the surrounding localities, in a 
kind of “demonstration effect”. As for the location aspects, there is a clear efficiency 
premium for state capitals, as those cities tend to present higher scores when compared 
with other localities with similar characteristics. The same effect could not be found for 
the metropolitan areas indicating that this somehow “privileged” location does not 
influence the computed efficiency. Finally, as expected, the municipalities located in the 
draught areas (Polígono da Seca), are likely to be less efficient than their counterparts in 
more clement areas thus showing that those cities, hit by adverse climatic conditions, 
have more difficulty of providing the required public services to its population. 
 
Socio-economic impacts: The income level and the poverty proxy (variables E3 and E4, 
respectively) were significant only when the efficiency scores were estimated by using 
the DEA-BCC variant; surprisingly, for both variables, the sign of the effects were 
reversed. So, the fact that a municipality is relatively impoverished does not implies per 
se a poor resource management. In spite of being characterized by a low-income 
population, those communes may rationally use their resources thus overcoming its 
disadvantage background. Furthermore, among the very poor municipalities, those 
which participate into the Alvorada Project, when we control for other factors, tend to 
be more efficient; probably, the monitoring required by this program contributes to 
increase the efficient use of scarce resources, signaling that a better management could 
be a by-product of the Alvorada Project.  
 
 10Table 5.1 Determinants of the DEA-CCR and DEA-BCC Efficiency Scores in the Brazilian Municipalities – 2001 
 
Dependent Variables: Efficiency Scores 
DEA-CCR DEA-BCC 
Explaining Variables 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2 
Intercept   1.027e+00 
 
-1.048e+00 





Log W1EFIC  3.890e-02 
(1.44e-14) 
3.826e-02 










E3: % of households whose head earns up to 









































E11: PPB  -3.011e-02 









E13: PDT  -6.848e-02 




















































































Royalties   -1.551e-01  







Multiple R-Squared:   0.2091  0.2059  0.1745  0.1732 
Adjusted R-squared:   0.2053  0.2037  0.1705  0.1705 
F-Statistic:   54.39 (< 2.2e-16)  94.53 (< 2.2e-16)  43.49 (2.2e-16)  66.16 (< 2.2e-16) 
Residual Standard Error  0.3074 (4731DF) 0.3077(4741)  0.2947(4731DF)  0.2947(4739  DF) 
Notes: i) ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level respectively;  ii) p-values in parenthesis. 
 
Finally, the municipalities that receive substantial royalty revenues (on oil and water) 
tend to be inefficient; although their per capita spending levels are very high, 
suggesting that they adjust expenses to their extra gains, this increased expenditure is 
not translated into more and better public services, thus explaining why those “over-
financed” communes have low efficiency scores. Rather than encouraging the 
 11optimality of resource use, those additional royalties receipts seem instead to contribute 
to relax fiscal constraints and spread inefficiency. Summarizing, our results clearly 
show that there is no direct relationship between higher revenues and better life 
conditions, as measured by the accessibility to public services.  
 
Economies of scale indicators: the scale variables included in the analysis were relevant 
for explaining efficiency in all versions estimated. Both, the demographic density and 
the urbanization rate had a strong positive effect on the efficiency scores thus 
corroborating previous insights suggested by the non-parametric analysis described in 
Section 3. Indeed, the fact that cities with very low-density rates tend to be less efficient 
is probably due to the presence of local increasing returns to scale prevalent among 
small municipalities. The scattered population on those cities tends to raise the average 
costs of public services, thus preventing them from exploiting the economies of scale 
that characterizes the production of those services, and so they fail to use optimally its 
resources. On the other hand, higher density rates decrease the costs of the above-
mentioned services and hence contribute to increase efficiency. The strong effect of the 
urbanization rate on efficiency measures (its p–value is inferior to  ) also 
captures the scale effect, as the average costs of local public services on the less 
inhabited rural areas tend to be higher. Moreover, this variable may catch the fact that 
human and material administration resources are scarcer in the rural areas thus reducing 




Political impacts: As for the impact of the mayor political party on efficiency, only the 
coefficients for the PMDB and for the PDT were significant at 5% level, thus indicating 
that municipalities run by a mayor coming from those parties tend to be more 
inefficient. This result holds for all tested models, including the ones using quantile 
regression, and deserve a more careful analysis. For the rest of the political parties, the 
mayor’s political affiliation does not affect the efficiency scores.  
 
Management variables: As for the management variables, surprisingly, we find out an 
inverse relationship between the efficiency scores and the degree of actualization of the 
real state register; such a relation is significant in all tested versions. This variable was 
supposed to be a proxy for a good fiscal administration; yet, our results consistently 
suggest that even if a mayor is eager to maintain its tax revenues, this not prevent him 
from neglecting the way it is spent. On the other hand, the inverse relationship between 
efficiency and participation in inter-municipal consortia may be due to the fact that, 
ceteris paribus, only the municipalities, which suffer the most from the lack of an 
adequate scale on the production of public services, thus being likely to present low 
efficiency scores, have an incentive to join those consortia in an attempt to reduce 
average costs. There is also a strong positive relationship between the efficiency scores 
and the degree of computer utilization (p-value:  ); such a relationship was 
expected; indeed, as computer utilization eases administrative tasks, it is a powerful tool 
on managing practice thus being an indicator of a “superior” and more effective 
decision-making process. Finally, in all tested models, we found that the higher the 
power accorded to municipal councils, the better the effectiveness in resource utilization 
as measured by efficiency indices. This is rather predictably as those councils tend to 
increase the transparency of the budgeting process hence contributing to a better control 
of corruption and misuse of local funds. 
13 10 36 . 3
− ×
 
 12Notice also that the test of Koenker (1981) points out to the presence of 
heteroskedasticity, thus justifying the utilization of robust standard errors. Indeed, the p-
value of the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is  , indicating strong 
evidence against the assumption of constant conditional variances.  
12 10 971 . 7
− ×
 
5.3 Quantile Regression Estimators 
 
To complement the econometric analysis carried out in the previous sub-section, we 
will proceed to a more detailed investigation by using quantile regression, introduced by 
Koenker and Bassett (1978). Just as classical linear regression permits to estimate 
models for conditional mean functions, quantile regression methods offer a mechanism 
for estimating models for the conditional median function, and the other conditional 
quantile functions. This allows us to investigate the impacts of the conditioning 
variables on the efficiency scores along different efficiency classes. The basic idea is to 
estimate the τ -th quantile of efficiency conditionally to the different explicative 
variables, assuming that this quantile may be expressed as a linear predictor based on 
those conditioning variables. In order to do that, we considered the following 
conditional quantiles: 0.10 (percentile 10%), 0.25 (quartile inferior), 0.50 (median), 0.75 
(quartile superior) e 0.90 (percentile 90%). In each case, we kept the explicative 
variables that proved to be significant. Results are shown in Table 5.2 (DEA-CCR) and 
Table 5.3 (DEA- BCC). 
 
Table 5.2: Determinants of the DEA-CCR Efficiency Scores in the Brazilian 
Municipalities – Quantile Regression – 2001 
Dependent variable:  DEA-CCR Efficiency Scores by Quantiles   Explaining Variables  
τ = 0,10  τ = 0,25  τ = 0,50  τ = 0,75  τ = 0,90 
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Firstly, notice that the geographic influence is present in all the quantiles analyzed; 
however, this influence is much stronger for the more inefficient municipalities. Remark 
also that the capital effect does not appear here indicating that, for those communes 
there is no such effect; this is probably due to the fact that there is only a few capitals 
and they are not situated in this extremely low range of efficiency. For the two next 
quantiles (τ = 0,25 and τ = 0, 50), in both, the CCR and the BCC variants, being a state 
capital improves efficiency, but for very efficient communes this fact no more matters. 
Finally, for the municipalities standing in the lower efficiency class, their location on 
the Draught Area (Polígono das Secas) is no more relevant for explaining efficiency, 
suggesting, that for such cities, other sources of inefficiency predominates over this 
particular location. 
 
Table 5.3: Determinants of the DEA-BCC Efficiency Scores in the Brazilian 
Municipalities – Quantile Regression – 2001 
Dependent  variables:  DEA-BCC Efficiency Scores by Quantiles  Explicative Variables  
τ = 0,10  τ = 0,25  τ = 0,50  τ = 0,75  τ = 0,90 
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As to the impact of socio-economic factors on efficiency, the quantile regression 
analysis, using the BCC version, is much more clarifying than the previous ones. 
Indeed, for the inefficient municipalities, it shows clearly that a higher proportion of 
low-income population contributes to increase efficiency scores, although this effect is 
 14rather small. The underlying reason is probably the fact that those communes usually 
benefit from a bunch of social programs that are closely monitored; thus, with them 
comes a pressure for more rational resource utilization. Regarding the impact of average 
income on efficiency, the BCC results confirms our previous finding that is has a 
negative effect on efficiency grounds. Finally, as for the royalties’ receipts, the quantile 
regression estimates confirm our anterior results according to which receivers of 
substantial royalty revenues are more inefficient. The new point here is the fact that this 
impact gets smaller when efficiency increases, being particularly damaging for extreme 
inefficient communes. This may indicate that they have no managerial capabilities to 
handle usefully those additional resources. 
 
According to those disaggregated results, the influence of politics on efficiency is 
similar to the one previously found. Except, for two parties, PDT and PMDB, the 
mayor’s political affiliation does not affect the efficiency scores. However, here, the 
estimated negative effect for those parties are not very significant; particularly, in the 
case of PDT, the negative effect is present only for the first two cases (τ = 0,10 and τ = 
0, 25).    
 
Moreover, our results reveal that the impact of the degree of computer utilization 
increases along the different conditional quantile. Indeed, the estimated coefficients 
corresponding to this variable for the conditional quantiles  75 . 0 . 50 . 0 , 25 . 0 , 10 . 0 = τ  are 
0.132, 0.126, 0.089 and 0.050, respectively, thus indicating the existence of diminishing 
marginal benefits for computer. Due to widespread use of computer equipment in the 
highly efficient municipalities, most likely, computer use is no longer a proxy for 
“superior” management. Contrary to the aggregate analysis, where the negative effect of 
the degree of actualization of the real state register on efficiency results was clearly 
verified, in the quantile regression analysis, this is true only for the more inefficient 
municipalities;  
 
On the other hand, we thought that the inverse relationship between efficiency and 
participation in inter-municipal consortia was caused by diseconomies of scale prevalent 
among inefficient municipalities. Yet, here the results shows that, except for the two 
extremes quantiles (τ = 0,10 and τ = 0, 90), this effect is quite widespread, thus 
suggesting, that even relatively efficient municipalities cannot reach the optimum size 
for hospitals, for instance, and thus seeks to join those consortia in an attempt to reduce 
costs. Notice also that for the lower classes of efficiency, the decision power of the 
municipal councils was less significant, thus meaning less control on the use of public 
resources once more attesting those cities lack of managerial capabilities. Last but not 
least as in the preceding analysis, the scale variables – demographic density and 
urbanization rate – have positive and significant effect upon efficiency. 
 
5.4 Alternative Results by Using Linear Regression  
 
To conclude our investigation, we will examine a data set where the municipalities do 
not have any vicinity relationship. This new sample was build up by selecting all the 
capitals and other cities randomly as long as no peers of municipality were at an inferior 
distance of 50 (fifty) kilometers. We hope, this way, to eliminate all the spatial 
correlation. The new data set includes 768 municipalities whose average efficiency is 
0.520, its median is 0.500, the standard deviation is 0.1795, and finally the minimum 
efficiency is 0.0947. With the DEA-CCR variant, roughly 2% of the communes turn out 
 15to be efficient. As before, in the econometric analysis, we first fitted a model including 
most of the conditional variables (model 1) and after, in model 2, we only considered 
the ones that were significant in the first model. Results are shown in Table 5.4.  
 
 
Table 5.4: Determinants of the DEA-CCR Efficiency Scores for Selected 
Brazilian Municipalities – 2001 
Explicative Variables    Model 1   Model 2 
   Coefficients  p-value   Coefficients  p-value  
Intercept   -7.795e-01  2.71e-09***  -0.719982    9.23e-10*** 
E1: Personnel expenses  2.621e-10  0.169141  -   -  
E3: % of households whose head earns up to 
1 minimum wage 
3.196e-03  0.070036  -   -  
E4: Average earnings  -1.307e04  0.132175  -   -  
E6: PFL  -7.254e-02  0.111793  -   -  
E7: PMDB  -5.010e-02  0.267346  -   -  
E8: PSDB  -3.212e02  0.488912  -   -  
E9: PT  -3.170e-02  0.656756  -   -  
E10: PPS  -1.499e-01  0.030415*   -0.108346   0.0726 
E11: PPB  -5.698e-02  0.293851  -    - 
E12: PTB  -5.456e-03  0.925034  -    - 
E13: PDT  -8.125e-02  0.196863  -    - 
E16: Actualization of the real state register  -2.297e-01  0.045026*   -0.216372   0.0560 
E17: Participation in inter-municipal consortia  -2.893e-02  0.292917  -    - 
E18: Degree of computer utilization  1.120e-01  0.000111***   0.057208  0.0330*  
E19: Decision power of municipal councils  5.194e-02  0.038016*    0.046399   0.0645  
E20: Demographic density  1.937e-06  0.955813  -    - 
E21: Urbanization rate  4.082e-03  1.19e-08***  0.002582   3.28e-05***  
E22:  Alvorada Project  6.570e-02  0.066931  -    - 
E23: Draught Area (Polígono da Seca)  -3.786e-02  0.300383  -    - 
Capital   3.304e-01  0.003270**   0.354782  2.42e-06***  
Metropolitan areas  7.922e-03  0.896420  -    - 
Royalties  -1.223e-01  0.029736*   -0.079908  0.1431  
Multiple R-Squared:   0.1505  -  0.1103  - 
Adjusted R-squared:   0.1254  -  0.1021  - 
F-Statistic:   5.999 (4.714e-16)  -  13.46 (2.2e-16)  - 
Residual Standard Error  0.3364 (745 DF)  -  0.3408(760)  - 
Notes: i) ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level respectively;  
 
 
As a general remark let us notice that in this new sample, the main results are quite 
similar to the ones obtained when the whole set was used. Yet, we observe a few 
noteworthy differences. Firstly, the density demographic, a variable that stands for 
economies of scale is no more significant. Secondly, the royalty receipts was not 
significant in this sample, in model 2, at the nominal level of 10%. In order to 
investigate this point, we estimate quantile regressions for the conditional 
quantiles: 90 . 0 , 75 . 0 , 50 . 0 , 25 . 0 , 10 . 0 = τ . We found out that the negative impact of 
royalties on efficiency is statistically significant only for the superior quartile,  75 . 0 = τ . 
This means that, for this sample, the results contradict the ones obtained when applying 
the both the BCC and the CCR methods on the whole set. Remember that in both 
models, clearly, the negative impact of royalty receipts decreased with the efficiency 
level. Lastly, the impact of the mayor’s affiliation party on efficiency changes a great 
deal as now neither the PMDB nor the PDT have the negative influence they used to 
have on the previous estimates. Rather, the PPS appears now as the only political party 
negatively affecting efficiency.  
 
 
 166. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this paper we have firstly estimated the DEA CCR and BCC technical efficiency 
scores for 4796 Brazilian municipalities by applying a method, which combines 
Bootstrap and Jackknife resampling techniques to eliminate the effect of outliers and 
measurement errors in the data set. The computed efficiency scores, as well as their 
rank, proved to be very robust for both variants, thus increasing the credibility of the 
estimated frontiers. As the estimated efficiency scores are affected by exogenous 
characteristics, which were not taken into account in our DEA calculations, we included 
those factors in our analysis. Hence, we used techniques of spatial econometrics and 
quantile regressions to investigate the way those excluded variables could influence the 
computed scores. Our econometric results proved to be very robust to the non-
parametric variants utilized to calculate the dependent variable. The estimated 
coefficients were also very stable when faced to variations on econometric 
specifications, techniques used and sample modifications.  
 
As we would expect, the spatial effect was consistently significant, thus showing that 
such an effect could not be ignored when dealing with municipal data. Also, being a 
state capital increases efficiency but the same is not true for municipalities located in 
metropolitan areas. In addition, as expected, the communes located in the draught areas 
(Polígono das Secas), tend to be more inefficient than their equivalents in more clement 
areas showing that those cities, hit by adverse climatic conditions, have more difficulties 
to offer an adequate supply of public services. 
 
The scale variables (demographic density and urbanization rate) played also an 
important role in explaining the efficiency scores thus corroborating our previous 
insight that the recent proliferation of small municipalities, in Brazil, does not lead to an 
efficient use of public resources. Their small size prevents these communes to benefit 
from the economies of scale inherent to the production of publics services and so, they 
tend to operate with higher average costs thus bringing about a considerable waste of 
resources.  
 
As for the management variables, on the other hand, the inverse relationship between 
efficiency and participation in inter-municipal consortia may be due to the fact that, 
ceteris paribus, only the municipalities, which operate on a scale much below the 
optimum, thus being likely to present low efficiency scores, have an incentive to join 
those consortia in an attempt to reduce average costs and increase efficiency. There is 
also a strong positive relationship between the efficiency scores and the degree of 
computer utilization.  Such a relationship was expected; indeed, as computer utilization 
eases administrative tasks, it is a powerful tool on managing practice thus being an 
indicator of a “superior” and more effective decision-making process. Our quantile 
regression estimates suggest that the more inefficient the municipality, the higher the 
benefits derived from computer utilization. We find out an inverse relationship between 
the efficiency scores and the degree of actualization of the real state register; such a 
relation is significant in all models tested. Finally, in all tested models, we found that 
the higher the power accorded to municipal councils, the better the effectiveness in 
resource utilization as measured by efficiency indices. This is rather predictably as those 
councils tend to increase the transparency of the budgeting process hence contributing 
to a better control of corruption and misuse of local funds. 
 
 17Also, the socio economic variables such as the municipality mean income level and the 
poverty  proxy  were significant only when the efficiency scores were estimated by 
means of the DEA-BCC variant; surprisingly, for both variables, the sign of the effects 
were reversed. Thus our results seem to imply that poor cities, by wisely using their 
resources, may overcome its initial environmental disadvantages. Furthermore, among 
the very poor municipalities, those participating in the Alvorada Project tend to be more 
efficient indicating that a better management could be a by-product of this program. 
Finally, the municipalities that receive substantial royalty revenues tend to be inefficient 
suggesting that this increased gains rather than encouraging the optimality of resource 
use, seem instead to contribute to relax fiscal constraints and spread inefficiency. 
 
The natural extension of our current investigation would be to use the econometric 
results to separate the effects of the exogenous factors from those related to the 
technical aspects of the productive process, in order to obtain a “pure” measure of 
technical efficiency for the Brazilian municipalities. 
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1 See Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978), Banker, Charnes, and Cooper  (1984), Färe, Grosskpof, and 
Lovell, (1985, 1994). 
2 For a more detailed analysis, see Färe, Grosskpof, and Lovell, (1994). 
3The reason why this happens lies on the flourishing creation of new municipalities in Brazil. Indeed, some 
municipalities, although legally created, have not yet being dismembered from the mother-commune. As a 
result, they do not report output indicators. In addition, null values for current expenses may be also 
explained by the fact that the data have not yet been reported by the STN (National Treasure Secretary). 
4 Notice that there is no direct interest in the estimation of λ and ρ. 